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seemingly at odds with the EU objective of achieving energy independence from Russia.
The question arises: Are these strategies sustainable? How can they be reconciled and
pursued under a common policy? The main argument is that such conflicting sub-regional
policy initiatives are amenable to progressive realignment and serve common security
objectives. The article examines the Nord Stream and Nabucco pipelines in the context of
the Third Energy Package, a set of policy instruments for the creation of an EU-wide
internal energy market. It demonstrates that the energy security strategies pursued
through Nord Stream and Nabucco fit well with the logic of the internal market reflected in
premises of flexibility and efficiency. The article concludes that the security of the EU's
energy market may be pursued in practice by applying different formulas relying on a
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This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol5/iss3/7

Stefanova: European Strategies for Energy Security in the Natural Gas Market

Journal of Strategic Security
Volume 5 Issue 3 2012, pp. 51-68
DOI: 10.5038/1944-0472.5.3.4

European Strategies for Energy
Security in the Natural Gas Market
Boyka Stefanova
University of Texas, San Antonio

Abstract
This article examines the European Union's (EU) approach to energy
security on the example of its natural gas imports from Russia, the largest
supplier of gas to European markets. Two major projects, Nord Stream in
the Northern and Western part of the EU, and Nabucco in South-Central
Europe, demonstrate opposing energy security strategies, seemingly at
odds with the EU objective of achieving energy independence from
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the creation of an EU-wide internal energy market. It demonstrates that
the energy security strategies pursued through Nord Stream and Nabucco
fit well with the logic of the internal market reflected in premises of
flexibility and efficiency. The article concludes that the security of the
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Introduction
Natural gas is poised for a bright yet complex future, also for
geopolitical reasons. The global gas market, very young at present, will
expand significantly, aided by climate worries, growing power
demands, and new LNG technology. Yet [...] …geopolitical difficulties
will exist regardless.1
The global energy trade stands at the intersection of business and politics.
Access to natural resources is a matter of national security affecting all
vital economic, defense, infrastructural, and social systems of the state.
Following the pattern of industrial development in the 20th century,
which relied primarily on oil and resulted in a recurrent rush for the
"black gold," the turn of the 21st century marked the rush for "blue
energy," that is natural gas. A base product for many applications across
industry, transport, and consumption, natural gas has reached global relevance. Cleaner and more efficient than oil and coal, it has important
advantages in terms of cost-effectiveness and environmental sustainability. However, natural gas is not substantively a more secure and reliable
energy resource, despite its economic and technological qualities. The
uneven distribution of the sources of natural gas globally, inflexible and
cost-intensive means of delivery, and high concentrations of consumption
due to geographic and population patterns create multiple asymmetric
dependencies between producers and consumers. Trade in natural gas is
not based on comparative advantage only. As most observers note, it lacks
some of the important features of conventional markets. Natural gas often
involves non-market price formation for end users. Prices for spot and
long-term contracts differ widely, regional concentrations of suppliers
and consumers are a source of interdependence and vulnerability and, in
the absence of good relations between exporters and importers, trade in
natural gas may be brought to a halt regardless of the underlying economic benefits it offers.2 As most international deliveries rely on pipelines, the participation of transit countries complicates the relationship
between suppliers and consumers with a potential for significant political
ramifications.3
The enmeshing of cost-benefit, reliability, affordability, and sustainability
concerns in the provision of natural gas is captured by the concept of
energy security. The latter represents a shorthand expression for objectives that require policy action, simultaneously reducing import dependence without compromising economic growth, addressing climate
change issues, securing effective supply routes, and minimizing risks of
political destabilization.4 The European Union (EU) is an example of an
energy market that promotes such broadened understanding of energy
52
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security to address more than the problem of dependence on a sole source
of deliveries, the security of transportation, and the sustainability of supply in view of changes in the structure of demand. Issues of environmental sustainability and the de-carbonization of the energy system form an
integral component of the European conception of energy security.5
While the practical implementation of such policy ideas is understandably
multi-dimensional, it is also inherently contradictory and politically contested. The policy mix includes often mutually exclusive approaches to
dealing with energy issues in the EU's internal market, including the
availability and reliability of supply, energy independence and cooperation, and economic efficiency and environmental sustainability.
The multiplicity of policy actions is often criticized for lacking common
conceptual foundations and value added in terms of energy security.6
There is a widely shared assumption that the EU needs to take a more
effective position on the international stage in order to secure its energy
needs.7 Some observers emphasize the need for a common energy policy
based on the diversification of sources and suppliers, which would reduce
Europe's external energy dependence. Others propose the decoupling of
the political from the technical and economic dimensions of energy policy, in an effort to boost efficiency, market integration, and environmental
sustainability.
This article examines the EU's approaches to energy security on the example of its natural gas imports from Russia, the largest supplier of gas to
European markets, and therefore a source of energy dependence. The
prevalent EU policy mix vis-à-vis Russia is an effort to reconcile the
diverse interests and often mutually exclusive strategies of public and private actors, member states and EU institutions, which simultaneously
depend on and exclude Russia as a reliable supply source. The launch of
two major initiatives, Nord Stream and The Southern Gas Corridor
(Nabucco), demonstrates such opposing strategies, seemingly at odds
with the objective of achieving energy independence from Russia. Both
projects are visionary, designed to cover the long-term needs of the EU
member states.
Nord Stream increases European energy supply by diversifying the routes
which carry natural gas to Western Europe. While nominally the pipeline
removes transit states, increases the efficiency of supply, and lowers the
opportunities for politicization of deliveries, it also increases the EU's
dependence on Russian gas by increasing the volume of imports into
Western Europe without diversifying the sources of supply.8
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Objectives of enhancing energy security in the south of Europe have
implemented the opposite strategy. The Nabucco pipeline was designed to
diversify supply by excluding deliveries of Russian gas. The project relies
on a large number of sources in the Caspian Sea region, Northern Iraq,
and possibly Iran, none of which guarantees long-term supply, and
includes several transit states. These conflicting strategies are pursued
against the background of an EU-wide consensus on common principles
of energy security. The lack of consistency in the case of the northern and
the southern route is at odds with the common objectives of affordability,
reliability, and sustainability of natural gas imports into the EU. The
question arises: Are these strategies sustainable? How can they be reconciled and pursued under a common policy? Is there a common denominator between the increase in gas imports from Russia through Nord Stream
and the diversification of suppliers through Nabucco without guaranteed
resource availability for the Southern Gas Corridor?
The main argument of this article is that the value added of such
conflicting policy approaches should not be considered as a trade-off
between their individual cost-benefit calculation of gains, risks, and
energy independence. Sub-regional solutions may not be amenable to a
one-size-fits-all EU energy security policy but they benefit from
progressive realignment in order to contribute to common security
objectives. In order to demonstrate the value of this seemingly piecemeal
adjustment, the article examines the Nord Stream and Nabucco pipelines
in the context of the Third Energy Package, a set of policy instruments for
the creation of an EU-wide internal energy market, in force since March
2011. The evidence shows that the diverse sub-regional and national
strategies in the natural gas sector are reconciled and gradually adjusted
through the logic of the internal market through premises of competition,
networks, and external partnerships with neighboring states and
suppliers. It concludes that, despite an underlying rationale of minimizing
dependence on imports from Russia, energy security in the EU natural
gas market should be derived from market integration, investment in
infrastructure, and policy convergence, beyond measures of the physical
security of supply and demand and/or supplier diversification.

The Sub-Regional View of Energy Security in the EU
in the Context of Imports from Russia: North vs.
South, East-West, and Offshore/Onshore
The EU-Russia energy relationship does not conform to a clear-cut policy
model. Western Europe has pursued a strategy of limiting its energy
54
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dependence on Russia since the 1980s. The debate has sought to determine whether the focus should be on diversifying energy supplies; that is,
reducing Russia's share as a source of energy imports, or on diversifying
the routes of supply while relying on Russia as a key supplier.9 The
enmeshing of political and economic factors has prevented the EU member states individually and multilaterally to develop a common long-term
approach to managing their trade relations with Russia in the natural gas
sector.
Unequal production, consumption, and import patterns among the EU
member states make joint decision-making in the area of energy difficult.
There are systematic or tightly organized sub-regional markets. For the
last 20 years, EU-based consumption of natural gas has almost doubled.
The EU imports over 60 percent of the quantities of natural gas it needs.
Imports reached 391.2 million tons of oil equivalent (TOE) in 2011, of
which 302.8 million TOE to the Eurozone.10 The Russian Federation is
the country of origin for around one-third of natural gas imports (intraEU trade excluded).11 Despite a long-standing commitment to energy
security, natural gas dependence in the EU stood at 60 percent in 2011. It
rose 2.3 percent in the Eurozone to 74.6 percent.12
The rise in world energy prices, instability in the Middle East, and the
challenge of reducing the environmental impact of energy production and
consumption have led the EU member states to include the diversification
of energy supply among their main priorities.13 Such trends are coterminous with estimates that Russia will remain an important global supplier
of natural gas. Despite an old transit system, Russia has significant assets
to transport natural gas to a large number of European markets. The
northern route includes both onshore and offshore pipelines. The central
route connects Southern Russia to Europe via the Ukraine. The southern
route carries natural gas from Southern Russia to a number of adjacent
countries. This route permits to expand Russia's links to suppliers in Central Asia with transport of natural gas from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan,
and Kazakhstan and exports to Ukraine and Turkey (via the Blue Stream
pipeline).14
The significant share of the EU-Russia energy trade in global flows historically suggests that the objective of minimizing the EU's energy dependence on Russia is amenable to market-based approaches which would
balance existing demand by means of trade diversification. At the same
time, typical of the nature of the gas market, the EU's imports from Russia
are affected by the quality of their political relations. The EU-Russia
Energy Dialogue, launched in 2000 as a framework for addressing trade
policy issues, is an example of energy diplomacy, whose main objective is
55
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to maintain stability in the bilateral relationship, while promoting the
process of regional integration within the EU. At the same time, the EURussia relationship is subject also to the geopolitical premises of energy
security, which include vulnerability, competition, resource conflicts, and
instability.
The enmeshing of market-based and geopolitical approaches to energy
security in Europe are reflected in the strategies, which private and public
actors across the EU pursue on a bilateral and multilateral basis to secure
their energy needs. Although demand for natural gas in Europe is growing
slowly as a result of stagnant economic conditions, import dependence is
expected to increase due to falling production from local sources of supply. The European Commission foresees an annual import gap of 200 billion cubic meters (BCM) natural gas by 2025 as a result of increased
reliance on gas consumption, as opposed to other fossil fuels, and limited
natural reserves.15
The level of dependence on imports from Russia varies widely, in view of
differences in terms of size and growth potential of national energy and
natural gas markets. The common preference of securing a reliable longterm supply of natural gas, therefore, imposes different priorities for the
EU member states. Ensuring the availability and sustainability of supply
to meet a growing demand is the main objective in the large Western
European markets, such as Germany, France, and Italy. The large number
of smaller markets in Central and Eastern Europe are characterized by
fragmentation and high dependence on energy imports from Russia. The
primary objective of these countries is to minimize the vulnerability of
their gas imports by means of diversification of sources of supply and
delivery systems through access to EU-based infrastructure and
resources. Furthermore, given the pronounced commitment of the European countries to environmental protection, all EU member states share
the view that energy security is accomplished through environmentally
sustainable sources of energy production.16 Environmental concerns add
an additional layer of requirements for the reliability and efficiency of gas
supply.
While most European countries are apprehensive about increasing
imports from Russia given its quasi-monopolistic position in the European gas markets, growing reliance on import and established transit
routes make the objective of diversification of supply less than automatic
or intuitive. Even though energy security is a shared EU objective, it is
implemented through a matrix of diverse country-specific priorities, not
necessarily amenable to compatibility, synergy, or complementarities.
The two principal natural gas projects, Nord Stream and Nabucco, are
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aimed at meeting demand for natural gas at the sub-regional level in the
EU, and demonstrate significant differences in terms of actors, strategies,
and commitment to reducing import dependence on Russia.

Nord Stream
In 2000, the Nord Stream project for the delivery of natural gas from Russia to Germany (then called the North European Gas Pipeline) was
included in the Trans-European Network-Energy (TEN-E) due to its
importance for European energy security.17 The Nord Stream consortium
was created in 2001 as a joint venture between Russia's principal gas
company Gazprom, whose majority shareholder is the Russian state, and
Wintershall and Ruhrgas, whose parent companies are BASF and E.ON,
respectively. The Dutch gas infrastructure company N.V. Nederlandse
Gasunie joined the consortium in 2008. Gazprom acquired 51 percent of
the company, BASF 20 percent, E.ON 20 percent, and Gasunie nine percent.18 The project was recognized as a project of European interest by the
European Parliament and the EU Council of Ministers in 2006.19 Nord
Stream has been designed as two parallel pipelines, each with an annual
gas transport capacity of 27.5 BCM. By 2030, 11 percent of Europe's natural gas will be transported through the new route.20
The construction of Nord Stream began in April 2010. The pipeline links
Russia's gas deposits to Germany and the European energy market
directly, bypassing transit countries. It advances energy security needs on
a commercial, investment, and efficiency basis. Even though the EU institutions publicly support the Nord Stream pipeline as a means of increasing the energy resources available to European economies, it fails to
resolve concerns about the common European energy policy and security.
The project depends exclusively on deliveries by Gazprom. The company
already supplies a quarter of Europe's natural gas. With growing import
volumes, Gazprom will increase its leverage on the European economy.21
Although the pipeline is a strategic step toward enhancing energy security, it also increases Europe's dependence on Russia. Furthermore, it
affects the distribution of benefits among participating actors and results
in repositioning between consumers and transit states.22
States that foresee a loss of national influence or security as a result of
Russia's move into the Baltic region voice a variety of specific concerns,
collectively undermining the contribution of the pipeline to the security of
supply. Countries bordering the Baltic Sea are sensitive to Russian presence in their territorial waters or Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). The
Nord Stream passes through the EEZs of Denmark, Finland, Germany,
Russia, and Sweden, while bypassing those of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
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and Poland. Such selective inclusion made the project controversial.23
Key transit states for Russian gas imports into Europe face another type
of security problem. As Nord Stream approaches its full capacity to transport 55 BCM of gas through the Baltic Sea, the importance of the onshore
Yamal-Europe pipeline is expected to diminish. The Yamal-Europe gas
pipeline has the capacity to transport 33 BCM of Russian gas per year. Its
route passes through Belarus and branches off into Yamal I, going
through Poland to Germany, and Yamal II, which transits through
Ukraine and Slovakia to reach Austria. Thanks to Nord Stream, Russia no
longer relies exclusively on territorial pipelines for gas exports to Western
European markets, giving less consideration to transit states in Central
and Eastern Europe.
The security implications of Nord Stream are complicated by an array of
environmental concerns regarding the construction and operation of the
project, which collectively have introduced uncertainty about its overall
ecological impact.24 Parallel proposals for the construction of alternative
onshore pipelines made by Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland suggest
that the strategy of eliminating transit states through inter-firm cooperation and market-based approaches is insufficient to improve energy security for all actors individually, despite aggregate efficiency gains.25
The further expansion of Nord Stream is likely to increase overall dependence on Russia, and not only in absolute terms. Gazprom's growing
influence as a producer increases its leverage in determining the scope of
supply, which could lead to unpredictability, price volatility, poor
resource management, and ultimately, political instability. From the perspective of security of supply, diversifying the delivery routes through
pipelines, such as Nord Stream, without diversifying the supplier does not
alleviate such risks.

Southern Gas Corridor
The Southern Gas Corridor is an initiative for the supply of natural gas
from the Caspian and Middle Eastern regions to Europe, which follows
the opposite strategy, that of diversification of suppliers to exclude Russia. Nabucco is the most important project for gas supply encompassed by
the Corridor, which includes also the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP),
designed to connect Greece, Albania and Italy. Together, the projects of
the Southern Corridor will provide the necessary transportation capacity
to deliver 60 to 120 BCM per year of Caspian and Central Asian natural
gas.
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The Nabucco pipeline started as a political initiative between Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria in 2002. The project is designed to
transport up to 31 BCM of gas over a distance of 3900 km from the Caspian region (Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan) to Baumgarten, a European
gas hub in Austria. The pipeline will meet the growing needs of the region
of Southern and South-Eastern Europe for natural gas and is expected to
increase the level of predictability of supply by means of diversification of
the source.
The Nabucco project has been the object of a number of modifications.
The original shareholders: The Hungarian MOL oil and gas company, the
Bulgarian Energy Holding (BEH), the Turkish Botas company, Austrian
OMV, German RWE, and Romanian Transgaz each acquired a 16.67 percent stake. MOL's relationship with OMV, the de facto leader of the
Nabucco project, was strained as a result of OMV's decision to sell its 21.2
percent stake in MOL to the Russian energy company Surgutneftegas for
$1.9 billion in March 2009. RWE threatened to abandon the project in
2011. In May 2012, BP—the company developing the Shah Deniz II natural gas field in Azerbaijan, which alone was expected to provide Nabucco
with around 10 BCM natural gas—also announced that it would leave the
project. The initial estimate of the cost of Nabucco of around €8 billion
has been repeatedly increased. The start of the construction was delayed,
and is envisaged for 2013 instead of 2011.With deliveries originally
expected to begin in 2017 and now postponed until 2018, the overall scale
of the project has diminished. While the European Commission has
worked to establish a productive multilateral framework for the Nabucco
pipeline by building a consensus among the transit and supplier states, it
has yet to resolve issues related to the availability of supply. A reduced
version of the project, Nabucco West, constructed over a distance of 1,300
km, will use either existing infrastructure on the territory of Turkey or the
projected Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP), in order to simplify construction and avoid duplication in view of the lack of supply. The transfer
of shares between shareholders and changing preferences for participation demonstrate that there is a continuing search for the optimization of
the project, and for re-negotiation of the distribution of benefits among
suppliers, consumers, and transit countries. Nabucco has not resolved the
issue about the complementarity between suppliers, access to the
resources of the Caspian Sea region, and the potential participation of
Russia and Iran as suppliers on a competitive basis.26
Russia's practical exclusion as a supply source for Nabucco, despite its
importance as an exporter of natural gas from Central Asia, led to a Russian counter proposal for the South Stream project, a direct competitor of
Nabucco and of the entire Southern Gas Corridor. South Stream, expected
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to become operational by the end of 2015, will carry annually up to 63
BCM of natural gas from Russia to Southern and Central Europe. The
pipeline will connect Russia with Bulgaria via the Black Sea and then split
into a northern leg, going through Serbia, Croatia, Hungary, and Slovenia
to Austria and Northern Italy, and a southern leg going to Southern Italy
through Greece. Similarly to Nord Stream, South Stream is based on the
concept of diversification of routes by eliminating transit countries. South
Stream bypasses the Ukraine, currently a route for 80 percent of Russia's
deliveries of natural gas to Europe. The European Commission has
responded with determination to pursue energy independence from Russia by prioritizing Nabucco as the most significant project under the
Southern Gas Corridor and pointing out that the technical requirements
for security are a condition for EU support for South Stream. Furthermore, while the Commission views South Stream as an alternative route
of supply, it also points out to the commitment to reducing the EU's overall dependence on natural gas through de-carbonization of the energy system and development of new and renewable sources of energy.27
The politics of increasing dependence on supplies from Russia through
Nord Stream and the search for independence from Russia through
Nabucco reveal the complexity of achieving energy security as a combination of market-based and geopolitical approaches. A political approach to
energy security by means of balancing and international bargaining may
be inadequate to correct for the deficiencies of the two pipelines, as both
Nord Stream and Nabucco represent suboptimal solutions for energy
security. A market-based approach in the case of Nord Stream is limited
to the physical security of supply, and does not preclude asymmetrical
relationships between suppliers and consumers in the energy market.
Increasing energy independence may not increase energy security. By
contrast, arrangements such as Nabucco, which pursue geopolitical balancing and energy independence, are less likely to achieve the security of
physical supply. They are exposed to the risk of multiple dependencies
and overinvestment in infrastructure, thus compromising the efficiency
and affordability objectives of energy security.
Viewed through the lens of the policy framework governing the EU's
internal energy market, the strategies of increasing the volume of imports
from Russia into the largest markets of Western Europe and excluding it
from deliveries to Central and Southern Europe are not necessarily a compromise and a trade-off of energy security. Despite their mutually opposing premises, the market-based and geopolitical strategies pursued in the
Nord Stream and Nabucco projects are compatible with the premises of
the EU internal energy market. As the following section demonstrates, the
application of policy instruments ensuring competition, interconnectivity,
60
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solidarity, and cooperation in the natural gas market provides a corrective
ensuring the progressive alignment of the two projects with the objectives
of energy security in the EU.

The Policy Mix for Upgrading the EU's Energy
Security: Market Efficiency, Solidarity, and Energy
Cooperation
The role of energy in the politics of European integration cannot be overstated. The formulation of a common energy policy is one of the historical
objectives that go back to the EU's roots as a common market and a system of joint decision-making. The energy system was placed at the center
of the peace narrative of regional integration in Europe in the 1950s,
embedded in the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community
(1951). A common energy policy was one of the founding themes of the
European Economic Community, reflected in the objective of securing
"more abundant energy at a cheaper price for the European economies."28 The EU's energy market and geopolitical status have changed
significantly since then. Despite policy innovation in the 1980s when
cooperation with Russia increased access to sources of natural gas for the
EU member states, most studies identify the Europe's rising dependency
on imports from Russia as a source of economic and political risk. Concerns for energy security, defined as quasi-synonymous to energy independence from Russia, became even more prominent in the wake of the
2004–2007 East-European enlargement. A statement on energy policy in
the Treaty for the Functioning of the European Union (Lisbon Treaty,
TfEU) reflects the shared preference of the EU member states for a common energy policy, implemented by means of an internal market, the
security of energy supply, efficiency and energy savings, and the development of new and renewable forms of energy.29

The Third Package
Building upon treaty commitments and the long-term strategy of creating
an internal market for energy, the so-called Third Package of EU legislation on the energy market (2009) formulates a set of rules for the creation
of a truly competitive energy market to be completed by 2014.30 The
Package posits a link between safe, secure, sustainable, and affordable
energy and economic competitiveness, as well as between the internal and
external aspects of the energy market. This policy innovation marks a
shift from an approach to energy security based on energy diplomacy and
individual high-efficiency projects to market integration and policy cohe61
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siveness.31 The new rules for the organization of the sector encourage
integration of the national energy markets by minimizing market fragmentation while seeking to guarantee competition by unbundling generation, production, and supply interests.
The twin propositions of market decoupling and solidarity bind together
the two principal dimensions of energy security: Diversification of suppliers and diversification of routes, which had remained separate in prior
policy approaches to energy security, including Nord Stream and
Nabucco. The separation of production, supply, and delivery interests
prevents vertical integration in the gas market and limits the opportunities for monopolistic dominance. The principle of decoupling has affected
Gazprom's position in Nord Stream by requiring the separation of gas
sales from transportation and ensuring access to transportation grids for
third parties. The instruments of energy policy now correct for the suboptimal effects of Nord Stream in the area of market concentration and
dependence, which conventional political approaches, such as rebalancing and linkage politics may be unable to resolve.
Russia and Gazprom have opposed the Third Package and its retrospective effect. Gazprom has argued that the new rules of decoupling and
third-party access will divert investment away from the planned expansion of Nord Stream through the construction of a second pipe.32 In reality, the separation of interests between export sales, delivery, and
infrastructure prevents Gazprom from acquiring a monopolistic position
in the market through vertical integration, maintains a competitive market environment, and limits the extent of Europe's dependence on Gazprom for investment in its transportation grid.
The proposition that a fully integrated energy market requires a developed external dimension has added new policy instruments for the diversification of supply sources and routes. The emphasis is on coordination,
network integration, overcoming the energy isolation of specific regions
in the EU, investment in infrastructure, and strengthening external partnerships.33 The external dimension of the EU's internal energy market
relies on the economics of market competition, the politics of market
access, and energy efficiency.34 The Third Package thus permits reformulation of the objective to reduce EU energy dependence on Russia into a
more complex policy mix. Besides conventional methods based on political choices for the diversification of suppliers, the Third Package promotes networks and investment projects within the EU internal energy
market. Competition in the area of investment in infrastructure promotes
the diversity of sources, suppliers, transport routes, and transport methods. Despite the fact that Nabucco and South Stream compete directly for
62
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the same pool of natural gas resources, the security of supply is considerably improved through investment in alternative supply/transit routes
and reverse-flow projects, thereby allowing natural gas to flow freely
across borders within the internal market.35 Such measures enhance the
effects of diversification of supply, anticipated through Nabucco, by integrating existing networks in the internal market based on interconnections, solidarity, and integration. The gradual rebalancing between the
internal and external dimensions of the market thus acts to correct for the
deficiencies of individual projects while improving policy cohesiveness.

Conclusion
The seemingly conflicting objectives of Nabucco and Nord Stream and the
piecemeal approach with which they have been implemented demonstrates that, outside rhetoric, there is no single strategy of accomplishing
energy security in Western and East-Central Europe. The northern strategy relies on market-based economic mechanisms of inter-firm cooperation and bilateral energy diplomacy, and achieves diversification of gas
transit routes by eliminating transit states and separating the political
from economic aspects of the gas trade. In the south, the EU endorsed a
strategy of diversifying the sources of supply by eliminating Russia as a
supplier under the Nabucco project. This article has argued that such
diverse policy approaches are compatible within the policy frameworks of
the EU internal natural gas market. Neither a system of balancing, nor
market efficiency per se is fully adequate to the needs of energy security.
The security of the EU's internal energy market may be pursued in practice by applying different formulas.
Whether pipelines adopt alternative transit routes and increase market
efficiency by reducing transit fees and third-party influence, or opt for
supplier diversification, potential risks remain. Such risks are systemic in
a global energy market in which long-term demand exceeds current projections of supply. Neither the EU, nor Russia can isolate themselves from
market trends. The key challenge for the EU is to resolve the efficiency
and availability aspect of energy security. For Russia, it is to abandon
monopoly through decoupling and cooperation. More complex measures,
such as growing economic interdependence binding together a multiplicity of actors and projects in the EU internal energy market, may be better
positioned to address the geopolitical vulnerabilities of Europe's natural
gas imports.
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This conclusion fits well with a common EU policy paradigm of energy
security defined as an increasingly comprehensive (multidimensional,
integrating across sources and routes of supply) and cooperative concept,
exceeding the format of an energy dialogue between suppliers and consumers to instead rely on networks, partnerships, and market integration
with non-members. That there is no single policy blueprint for achieving
energy security but rather a piecemeal, network approach of gradual integration of measures and actors is reflected in the selective application of
energy diplomacy, geopolitical, and market-based approaches reconciling
and upgrading the preferences of private and public actors, importers and
exports, consumers and transit states. The process is one of progressive
alignment to the modalities of market competition and efficiency.
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